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ABSTRACT
In this paper we claim that a widely applicable and efficient means
to fight against malicious mobile Android applications is: 1) to per-
form runtime monitoring 2) by instrumenting the application byte-
code and 3) in-vivo, i.e. directly on the smartphone. We present
a tool chain to do this and present experimental results showing
that this tool chain can run on smartphones in a reasonable amount
of time and with a realistic effort. Our findings also identify chal-
lenges to be addressed before running powerful runtime monitoring
and instrumentations directly on smartphones. We implemented
two use-cases leveraging the tool chain: FineGPolicy, a fine-grained
user centric permission policy system and AdRemover an adver-
tisement remover. Both prototypes improve the privacy of Android
systems thanks to in-vivo bytecode instrumentation.
1. INTRODUCTION
Android is one of the most widespread mobile operating system
in the world accounting 48% market share [5]. More than 300 000
Android applications available on dozens of application markets
can be installed by end users. On the official market of Google
(Google Play, formerly AndroidMarket), more than 10 000 new ap-
plications are available every month.1 For the end user, download-
ing an application on his smartphone is similar to choosing an apple
on an apple tree: he only sees the surface and has no evidence that
there is no worm in it. Unfortunately there are many worms of
different kinds waiting for entering smartphones such as malware
leaking private data and adware calling premium-rate numbers.
In this paper we claim that a widely applicable and efficient mean
to fight against malicious mobile applications is: 1) to perform
runtime monitoring and interception; 2) by instrumenting the ap-
plication bytecode and 3) in-vivo, i.e. directly on the smartphone.
We present a tool chain to do this and present experimental results
showing that this tool chain can run on smartphones in a reasonable
amount of time and with a realistic effort. Before further introduc-
ing our contribution let us defend our key claim.
Why performing runtime monitoring and interception? Runtime
1http://www.appbrain.com/stats/number-of-android-apps
monitoring consists of observing the behavior of an application
during execution, for instance by collecting certain metrics, or by
intercepting all exchanges at the interface between the application
and the rest of the system. Runtime monitoring is often used to
achieve better privacy and security. Privacy can be improved for
instance by tainting sensitive data [8], or for Android, by enforcing
a finer-grained permission model. Security can be improved for
instance by detecting anomalies in I/O behavior [13]. In this pa-
per, we discuss two case-studies involving runtime monitoring and
interception, including an implementation of a fine-grained permis-
sion model on top of the Android software stack as proposed in [19]
in order to maximize privacy.
Why performing bytecode instrumentation? There are at least
two manners to perform runtime monitoring and interception: mod-
ification of the Android software stack or bytecode instrumentation.
Modification of the software execution stack consists of altering the
operating system or the core libraries to intercept the required infor-
mation. On Android, it means changing the underlying kernel, the
Dalvik virtual machine or the Android framework. Unless convinc-
ing the Android consortium, this is rather limited in deployment
since normal end-users have neither the rights (jailed phones) nor
the ability to do so. Bytecode instrumentation is one of the lightest
way to perform runtime monitoring on top of execution platform
that can not be modified. In the context of a fine-grain policy en-
forcement for improving privacy, we are able – thanks to bytecode
instrumentation – to enforce a fine-grained permission model of ap-
plications already deployed on Android smartphones without any
modification of the Android software stack.
Why performing in-vivo instrumention directly on smartphones?
Bytecode instrumentation can be done inside an app market, on
a PC or even in the cloud. All of them have fundamental limita-
tions. A key point of the success of Android is the sheer diversity
of Android markets. Why should users bind themselves on apps
of a single market and trust a single monopolistic instrumentation
and detection process? About a PC-based instrumentation process,
are users able to transfer an app and instrument it on their own
PCs? would they be ready to wait hours or days for getting the
instrumentation PC before safely using an instrumented app? We
think that these are key blocking factors. Let us now consider a
cloud-based service providing bytecode instrumentation. This may
sound great but this solution is very much hampered by legal con-
siderations: many countries forbid distributing binary applications
to third-party services (e.g. France), similarly to certain terms of
service of several markets (e.g. Google Play for Android). To us,
an instrumentation process that is installed once and directly runs
on smartphones is a way to overcome all these issues at once.
However, to our knowledge, there is no proposal of such an in-
strumentation process on Android nor there is a study describing
whether it is feasible to run it on real apps in a reasonable amount
of time.
This is the contribution of this paper:
• Section 2 describes a tool chain for instrumenting Android
applications directly on smartphones.
• Section 3 describes the design and concrete implementation
of kinds of bytecode instrumentation for the security and pri-
vacy of smartphones.
• Section 4 demonstrates the feasibility of running the whole
tool chain in a reasonable amount of time.
• Section 5 discusses the related work and Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. TOOLCHAIN FOR IN-VIVO BYTECODE
INSTRUMENTATION
This section presents a toolchain for performing bytecode instru-
mentation of Android apps in vivo, i.e. directly on smartphones.
2.1 Android Apps in a Nutshell
Android applications are written in Java, compiled into Java byte-
code and finally converted to Dalvik bytecode, a bytecode for-
mat optimized for embedded devices. An Android application is
a signed zip file (called apk or AndroidPacKage file) containing
the Dalvik executable, the AndroidManifest.xml (applica-
tion metadata), data (e.g. images), and the public key needed to
check the provided signatures of all files.
2.2 Requirements
Instrumenting and repackaging an Android application so that
it can run again is not straightforward. It consists of extracting
the executable code from the application code, analyzing and in-
strumenting it, rebuilding a new working android application and
signing it again, since the OS requires code to be signed.
We now devise a toolchain for this, based on the following re-
quirements:
1. The Android OS must be unmodified (for the sake of a broad
applicability, see intro);
2. The Dalvik virtual machine that runs Android applications
must be unmodified, in particular in terms of configuration
values such as the maximum heap size (for the sake of a
broad applicability, see introduction);
3. The hardware that is used to instrument bytecode must be
representative of common smartphones on the market.
2.3 Toolchain
To execute a whole analysis process of Android applications on
smartphones, one needs to: 1) Extract code from Android applica-
tion apk files; 2) Modify the extracted code with bytecode manip-
ulation tools; 3) Rebuild a new Android application containing the
modified code. Each step of this process requires a certain amount
of time to be performed.
Those three steps can decomposed in five elementary steps, as
shown on Figure 1: i) Extracting and converting the Dalvik byte-
code into Java bytecode(step a-b), ii) Manipulating the bytecode
(steps b-c), iii) Translating this representation back to Dalvik byte-
code (step c-d), iv) Rebuilding a new apk file (step d-e) and v) Fi-
nally signing all files with a new private key (step e-f). Let us now
discuss the tools that are used in each step.
i) Extracting the Dalvik bytecode..
The first step, as shown in Fig. 1.(a-b), is to extract the classes
.dex file from the apk file and convert it to Java bytecode classes
that can be analyzed with standard unmodified Java bytecode anal-
ysis toolkits. For this step, we use the tool dex2jar2.
ii) Instrumenting the bytecode..
In this step, we experiment with two different tools.
ii.a) Soot. Classes are transformed to Jimple with the Soot anal-
ysis toolkit. Soot [20] is an open-source analysis toolkit for Java
programs. It operates either on Java source code or bytecode. It
allows to analyze and transform programs. For instance, an intra-
procedural flow analysis could determine if a variable can be null
at some point in the code. Soot can also perform different call-
graph analyzes, useful for specific bytecode instrumentation. Most
analyses and transformations in Soot use an internal representation
called Jimple. Jimple is a simple stack-less representation of Java
bytecode We ported Soot for Android system by converting its Java
bytecode to Dalvik and creating a wrapper Android application.
ii.b) ASM. We experienced that Soot is sometimes slow and re-
quires a lot of resources (especially memory). Thus, we also run
ASM for bytecode instrumentation. ASM [3] is a Java bytecode en-
gineering library. One of its characteristics is that it is lightweight
hence more suitable for running on systems constrained in term of
memory or processing resource. It is primarily designed to ma-
nipulate and transform bytecode although it can also be used to
perform some program analysis. It features a core API to perform
simple transformations as well as a tree API to perform more com-
plex bytecode transformations (which requires more CPU process-
ing and memory space).
iii) Translating the modified bytecode back to Dalvik
bytecode..
Once the classes are analyzed and modified by the analysis toolkit,
they are transformed back into Dalvik bytecode using dx3 which
generates the classes.dex file from Java class files. This step
is illustrated in Fig. 1 as the edge c-d.
iv) Rebuilding application..
As presented in Fig. 1.(d-e), after the fourth step, a new Andoid
application is built. The newly generated classes.dex, the data
and the Android manifest from the original application are inserted
in a new zip4 file.
v) Signing the modified application..
Android requires applications to bear a cryptographic signature.
Hence, all files of the generated zip file are signed using a newly
created couple of public/private keys (not represented on the fig-
ure), and the new public key is added to the zip (not represented on
the figure). For this, we used the keytool and jarsigner Java
programs on the Android platform (Fig. 1.(e-f)).
2.4 Recapitulation
We have devised a bytecode manipulation process on Android
using standard tools. The following presents the design and imple-
mentation of two concrete bytecode instrumentations and an eval-
uation of the time required to run the whole process on real appli-
cations.
2http://code.google.com/p/dex2jar/
3using com.android.dx.command.Main.class from the
Android SDK
4using the java.util.zip library
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Figure 1: Process to Generate New Apk
3. USE CASES
There are different scenarios in which it would be beneficial to
manipulate and analyse Android applications (more specifically the
bytecode of the application) directly on smartphone devices. In this
Section we present two scenarios we implemented: AdRemover and
FineGPolicy.
3.1 Advertisement removal
Android enforces a per-application policy-based security model:
Either all parts of an application benefit from a given permission, or
none of its parts. Furthermore, Android applications are distributed
as self-sufficient packages, bundling together both specifically de-
veloped code and the third-party libraries they may need, such as
binary-only advertisement modules.
Put together, these two facts mean that when a user grants per-
missions to an application, she actually grants permissions to com-
ponents potentialy written by different entities, with different goals
and different security levels. If this user does not want, or is for-
biden by her organization’s policy to transmit her location to ad-
vertisement companies, she is not offered a way to express that, for
example, a newspaper app is allowed to send her location back to
the app publisher so that she is presented with local news, but this
app is not allowed to send location data to a third-party. In such a
case, the user faces a dilemma: She has to either reduce her security
and/or privacy level expectation, or refrain from using an otherwise
valuable application.
Several Ad libraries have been shown to use the dynamic code
loading facilities provided by Android to download code from the
Internet [12]. This raises potential security issues, since it may
enable an attacker to inject malicious code that could leverage per-
missions granted to the host application.
Advertisement libraries also have a significant impact on mobile
handsets stamina. Indeed, third-party advertisement modules can
be held responsible for up to 65%-75% of energy spent in free ap-
plications [15].
Despite these issues, nearly half of the Android applications em-
beds third-party code to handle in-app advertisement [16]. A sig-
nificant proportion of ad-supported apps include at least two adver-
tising libraries [18].
3.1.1 Overview
Static analysis can be used to detect privacy and security issues
of Android applications [12, 11]. Our tool chain allows these kind
of static analysis to be performed, and provides a framework for im-
plementing mitigation of the privacy and security threats detected
by static analysis.
To demonstrate sub-application granularity possibilities offered
by our program manipulation tool chain, we devised a method to
prevent an application subset (i.e. a library or a set of libraries)
from performing potentialy privacy-violating or security-breaching
actions.
In order to avoid the need to reverse engineer every code module
one might want to inhibit, we propose a generic, heuristics-based
approach to hinder a library’s operations. We then employ this ap-
proach to remove advertisement from Android applications.
3.1.2 Implementation
Our AdRemover tool currently focuses on two widely used An-
droid advertisement modules. We collected the Java package names
used by these libraries and we configured AdRemover to operate
only on classes that are part of those packages.
Potentialy dangerous code often requires IO operations, Network
data transfer for data leakage, GPS polling for location tracking or
phone network for sending short messages.
Unlike regular local and repeatable computation, developers should
expext IO operations to fail on a regular basis, depending on unpre-
dictable context. For example, all kind of communication will be
impossible if the device has no network coverage whatsoever.
Building on this observation, we make the assumption that po-
tentialy dangerous code have been placed by developers inside a
Try/Catch block to cater for exceptions raised by IO failures.
As a first step, our tool leverages this assumption and inhibits ev-
ery Try/Catch5 section of the targeted packages of the application.
For every Try/Catch block it encounters, our tool obtains the type
of the handled exception, creates such an exception object, and in-
serts an instruction that throws this exception at the very begining
of the block.
To further hinder the third-party module’s operations, our tool
then renders inoperant a collection of utility methods. Our tool
searches for every methods in targeted packages whose return type
is either void or String (respectively), and replaces the body of the
method by either a return; statement or a return(""); state-
ment (respectively).
We produced two implementations of AdRemover: One using
Soot and one using ASM.
3.2 Fine-Grained Permission Policy
Android framework relies on a permission-based model and fol-
lows an “all or nothing” policy. At installation time, users must
accept or reject permissions requested by application developers.
An application is installed only if all the requested permissions are
accepted. There is no way to accept certain permissions (such as
accessing the geolocalization data) and refuse others (such as con-
necting to the Internet) not directly related to the main functional-
ities of the application. Users are doomed to completely trust the
application developers. Enck et al. [9] have pointed out that an ap-
plication with several sensitive permissions is a real security threat.
For instance if an application requests the permission to send SMS
and to read the contact list, the contact list could potentialy be sent
to a remote phone by writing it in a text message and sending this
message by SMS. Enforcing a finer-grained permission model is a
efficient way to achieve a higher level of privacy for the user.
We propose to give users the ability to specify their own set of
admissible permissions (according to their own usage) and that a
system enforces this user-defined policy. Running such user-level
5Although the soot implementation of AdRemover performs ma-
nipulation in the Jimple language, we stick here to Java terminol-
ogy for simplicity
security policy is possible on unmodified Android systems by ma-
nipulating the application bytecode at installation time.
3.2.1 Overview
For a user-centric policy to exist, we need to instrument the byte-
code of every application one whishes to control. All API calls
which require one or more permissions are redirected to a policy
service which allows or not the call.
When the instrumented application runs, the user-defined policy
is enforced by the policy service. Indeed, for every instrumented
method, the running instrumented application calls the policy ser-
vice and the policy is checked. If the policy allows the original API
method call, the API call is performed. Otherwise, a fake imple-
mentation is executed and returns a fake default value.
3.2.2 Implementation
Our tool enforces a user-defined policy at the user level (also
called application level). It allows users which can not modify the
system policy to enforce their own policy for a set of applications.
Instrumenting the Application.
The first step is to instrument the bytecode of an application one
whishes to control to limit its permissions. This is illustrated in
Figure 2 where application X is represented as a graph of method
calls starting from node s. All method calls which require one or
more permissions [10, 1] are wrapped with code which:
1. asks the policy service if the application is authorized to call
the method
2. according to the answer from the policy service either in-
vokes the original method or the the fake method.
For instance, the getLocation(p1) method invocation of
node 7 (which requires permission GPS) has been wrapped in the
figure by a call to the policy service. If this call returs null the orig-
inal getLocation(p1) is executed, otherwise a fake method is
invoked.
There are N instrumentations where N is the number of API
calls under consideration present in the application bytecode.
Defining the Policy.
The next step, as shown in Figure 3, is to define the policy re-
garding the instrumented applications. The user defines a set of
allowed methods for each application. In Figure 3, only method
getLocation() is allowed for application X ′.
Note that this step could be performed first to instrument only
method calls which are not authorized by the policy. However, in-
strumenting every API method calls which requires one or more
permissions makes it possible to change the policy at runtime.
Policy Service.
Finally, when the instrumented application runs, the policy is
enforced by the Policy service as shown in Figure 4. For every in-
strumented method (here the original/instrumented method is get
Location and its associated permission GPS) the running appli-
cation calls policyCheck() (step A) and the policy is checked
by calling policyHas() (step B). Method policyCheck()
returns null if the policy allows the original method, a stub ser-
vice reference otherwise. If the original method is allowed in
the policy, the original method is called (this is the case in Figure
4, since step C returns null). Otherwise, the stub method corre-
sponding to the original method is executed: step D would return
s
2 3 4
5
6 7 8
r = obj.getLocation(p1);
s
2 3 4
5
6 7 8
stub = policyCheck(getLocation);
if (stub == null)
r = obj.getLocation(p1);
else
r = stub.getLocation(p1);
step1
X app. X ′ app.
Figure 2: Step 1: Instrumenting Application Bytecode
X ′ {
getLocation();
}
Y ′ {
...
Policy file
Figure 3: Step 2: Defining the Policy
s
2 3 4
5
6 7 8
stub = policyCheck(getLocation);
if (stub == null)
r = obj.getLocation(p1);
else
r = stub.getLocation(p1);
policyCheck(Method m)
if (policyHas(m))
return null;
else
returnStub(m);
code stub 1
code stub 2
. . .
code stub N
X ′ {
getLocation();
}
Y ′ {
...
Policy file
X ′ app. Policy service
A
B
C
D
Figure 4: Step 3: Enforcing the Policy
a reference to the stub service 2 which implements the fake getLo-
cation method. Here, stub2 handling method getLocation is
not executed .
3.3 Conclusion
AdRemover.
We implemented our advertisement removal tool with both soot
and ASM. The whole application modification process takes less
than 15 seconds on a recent PC laptop with the soot implementation
and is even quicker with the ASM implementation.
We tested that our tool is functional by manually selecting one
application from the dataset described in section 4.3. We made sure
that the test application was using one of the two advertisement
modules currently handled by AdRemover.
First we ran the unmodified test application on an Android de-
vices, and confirmed that it was a working application, and that it
displayed advertisements.
We then sent this application through our tool chain (with the
soot implementation) running on a PC, and tested the modified ap-
plication and confirmed it was still functional, and that no more
advertisements were displayed. We monitored the network con-
nection during the modified application test, and we found that it
did not send any ad request anymore.
Finally, we processed the unmodified application again, this time
running the bytecode manipulation directly on the smartphone. Run-
ning this modified application yielded the same results as with the
application modified on a standard PC.
FineGPolicy.
We implemented the policy service as an Android service and
the instrumentation code as a plugin for the static analysis tool
Soot. We tested methods of two stub services we implementeted
(ActivityManager, LocationManager) on one Android application
on a desktop computer. The application is first instrumented and
then repackaged into a new application which is then signed.
We ran the instrumented application on an Android device, and
tested it with different policies. We were able to validate that the
user-supplied policy was enforced as expected.
Those two implemented scenarios are further evaluated in Sec-
tion 4.
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section we present the results of applying the instrumen-
tation process presented in section 2 and summarized in Fig. 1. The
goal is to know: 1) whether it is possible to manipulate bytecode
on smartphones given the restricted resources of the hardware. 2)
whether it takes a reasonable amount of time.
4.1 Measures
We measured the execution time of the five steps of the instru-
mentation process on a set of 130 Android applications. This An-
droid applications set is described in Section 4.3. We run the instru-
mentation process on three different Android smartphones whose
configurations are presented in Section 4.2.
The feasibility of the whole process is measured by the time to
pass every step of the toolchain (1: dex2jar, 2: Soot/ASM , 3:
dx, 4: customZip, 5: signature). Moreover, the time to run
each step is measured as well as the number of applications that
successfully go through the step.
For the second step of the process (Step: Instrumenting the byte-
code), we evaluate both ASM and Soot. For ASM , we measure
the time required to instrument Java bytecode on the AdRemover
case study. The AdRemover transformation leverages the ASM tree
API and parses all classes to transform specific methods return-
ing String or void as well as try/catch blocks. Soot is evaluated
by measuring the time it requires to generate Java classes on both
AdRemover and FineGPolicy case studies.
4.2 Experimental Material
We conducted the experiment on three Android-based smart-
phone devices. Their configuration is detailed in Table 1. Indeed, it
is a parameter that influences the results of bytecode manipulation
tools which are memory demanding. The main differences are the
processor clock speed (0.8, 1.2 and 1.4GHz), the total amount of
main memory (512, 768 and 1024MiB), the Android version (2.2,
2.3.4 and 4.0.3) and the maximum heap size of the Dalvik virtual
machine (24, 32 and 48). Since the heap size controls the maxi-
mum memory that can be allocated it also controls the maximum
Name Processor Memory Android Heap Size
smartphone1 ARM 800MHz, 1 core 512MiB 2.2 24MiB
smarthpone2 ARM 1.2GHz, 2 cores 768MiB 2.3.4 32MiB
tablet1 ARM 1.4GHz, 4 cores 1GiB 4.0.3 48MiB
Table 1: The Hardware used in our Experiment
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Figure 5: Descriptive Statistics of our Dataset (boxplots)
number of objects that can be allocated simultaneously.
The number of cores also differs. However, we do not take ad-
vantage of multiple cores during the experiments. This hardware
complies with requirement #3 mentioned in 2.2.
4.3 Dataset
The choice of a dataset is important because it reflects real world
applications. Choosing a poor dataset may yield to better results
(for instance if the code within applications is always small) but
non useful results since they are non applicable on most real world
applications. We apply the whole experimental protocol on a set
of 130 Android applications randomly selected among the top 500
applications from the Android market6. They span various domains
such as finance, games, communications, multimedia, system or
news.
To give a better overview on these applications, Fig. 5 shows the
key application metrics as boxplots. They indicate that most (75%)
of Android applications have less than 614KiB of Dalvik bytecode,
less than 602 classes, an average method degree smaller than 3.
These applications also have less than 48 calls to a method of the
Android API which require a permission. The most important re-
sults are the two former. Indeed, one of our hypothesis is that the
processing time of a bytecode manipulation is highly dependent on
the size of the bytecode. The other states that the time to create
a new apk file from an original apk file also depends on the size
of the original apk file. Hence, the lower the code and application
size, the lower the processing time.
4.4 Dalvik to Java Bytecode Conversion
The conversion time from the Dalvik executable code to Java
bytecode using dex2jar is shown in Fig. 6.
Observation 1 The classes.dex file size ranges from 7 to 4061
KiB. All dex files can be successfully converted to Java classes us-
ing a desktop computer. However, smartphone1 is unable to pro-
cess any dex file. When using smartphone2 and tablet1, 26 and
11 dex files, respectively, caused the conversion Android applica-
6http://play.google.com
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Figure 6: Dalvik to Java Bytecode Conversion Time.
tion dex2jar to crash. This crash is either an OutOfMemory or a
StackOverflow exception.
smartphone1 result is explained by the hard-coded maximum
heap size of Android (32MiB or 48MiB). For the two other de-
vices, crashes are to be attributed to the default 8KiB stack size. In
total, 104 (80%) Android applications were successfully converted
to a jar file on smartphone2 and 119 (91%) on tablet1.
Observation 2 We notice that the conversion time is linear with the
size of the dex file (of the form a · X + b) for a Dalvik bytecode
size less than 4000KiB. Using linear regression, we find that for
smartphone2 a equals 0.069 and b equals 0.3. For tablet1 we have,
0.049 and -0.4.
Observation 3 The time to convert dex files to jar does not exceed
60 seconds on smartphone2 and tablet1 for most of the applications
(75%).
Observation 4 The application with the biggest dex file (4000KiB)
was successfully converted both on smartphone2 and on tablet1.
Conclusion 1 Converting Dalvik bytecode to Java bytecode is fea-
sible and realistic since the conversion time does not exceed 250
seconds on our dataset of Android applications. Furthermore, there
is a linear relation between the conversion time and the size of the
Dalvik bytecode which enables us to theoretically predict the nec-
essary amount of time to convert any size of Dalvik bytecode (if we
extrapolate for size bigger than 4000KiB). For instance, the time
to process the Android application with 10MiB of Dalvik byte-
code would be 700 seconds for smartphone2 and 500 seconds for
tablet1.
As we can see by looking at the result from smartphone1, the
heap size has a real impact on the result and dex2jar needs a mini-
mum heap size (24 < minSize <= 32) to process dex files. Since
Android devices become more and more powerful the default heap
size of the Android system grows. Indeed, in Android 2.2 the
heap size is 24MiB, in Android 2.3.4 32MiB and in Android 3.0
48MiB. This continued growth allows to convert Android applica-
tions which have bigger Dalvik bytecode size.
Last but not least, the size of dex files is not the only factor which
impacts the correct processing of dex2jar (the biggest application of
our dataset was correctly processed), but its complexity also plays
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Figure 7: Transformation Time of Java Bytecode with ASM
a role. The more complex the code is the more memory dex2jar
requires.
4.5 Bytecode Manipulation and Use Cases Eval-
uation
4.5.1 Manipulation With ASM
Transformation time of Java bytecode using ASM is represented
Fig. 7. In this experiment ASM does the AdRemover transforma-
tion described in 3.1. This transformation is based on the ASM tree
API.
Observation 5 All 104 applications that were successfully trans-
formed with dex2jar on smartphone2 were successfully processed
by ASM. It processes every jar (up to 4MiB in size) in less than 60
seconds.
Observation 6 We notice that the transformation time is linear with
the size of the jar files (of the form a ·X+ b) for a Dalvik bytecode
size less than 4000KiB. Using linear regression, we find that for
smartphone2 a equals 0.146. For tablet1 we have, 0.025.
Conclusion 2 Manipulating bytecode on smartphones using ASM
is feasible. For all the bytecode analyzes and transformations that
can be implemented with ASM, this is a promising result.
4.5.2 Manipulation With Soot
Recall that Soot was ported on the smartphone without any mod-
ification and that it was not designed to run on such platforms.
Observation 7 Out of the 130 Android applications 3 are correctly
processed by Soot on smartphone2 and 19 on tablet1.
Observation 8 It takes less than 30 seconds to convert any jar
which size is less or equal to 20KiB on smartphone2 whereas it
takes less than 18 minutes to convert any jar which size is less or
equal to 80.5KiB.
Conclusion 3 Using Soot directly on smartphones is feasible only
for the smallest applications. However, when it successfully runs
on a jar file it means that all classes of the jar files are loaded within
Soot and that their bytecode can be manipulated. Soot successfully
established the hierarchical relations between classes enabling ad-
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Figure 9: Conversion Time of Java Bytecode to Dalvik
vanced manipulations on bytecode and/or on abstractions of the
bytecode.
We assume that the heap size is the main blocking factor of us-
ing Soot on smartphones directly. To check this assumption, we
conducted an experiment on a desktop computer consisting of an-
alyzing our dataset of Android applications with different maximal
heap sizes (from 5Mib to 50Mib by steps of 5Mib). Results are pre-
sented Fig. 8. Soot was able to process 67 applications with a heap
size of 50Mib. Those results clearly indicate that maximum half
of the Android applications could be processed with a heap size
of 50MiB. Under the assumption that the heap usage (hence the
maximum required size) is similar on the Java and Dalvik virtual
machines, it means that the memory is actually the main blocking
factor of using Soot on Android.
We also notice that Soot takes much more time on tablet1 which
is running Android 4 than on smartphone2 which is running An-
droid 2. We hypothesise that the problem emerges because of dif-
ferent implementations and/or configurations of the heap and mem-
ory management of the Dalvik virtual machine between different
Android versions.
4.6 Java Bytecode to Dalvik Conversion
Once an instrumented application has been produced at the Java
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Figure 10: Creation Time of a New apk File
bytecode level, it has to be transformed back into Dalvik bytecode.
Conversion time from Java classes to the dex file using the dx tool
is shown in Fig. 9.
Observation 9 Java Bytecode of 33 and 39 applications on smart-
phone2 and tablet1, respectively, have been successfully converted
to Dalvik bytecode.
Observation 10 Conversion time for jar files ranging from 20 to
400KiB does not exceed 80 seconds.
Conclusion 4 The Dx tool is one bottleneck. It can only correctly
process 25 to 30% of the applications. This tool is used off the
shelf and can be optimized to run on devices where resources are
limited. For instance, instead of puting every Java classes in mem-
ory it could process class after class to limit memory consumption.
4.7 Creating a New apk File
The time taken to create an apk file from the instrumented Dalvik
bytecode is shown in Fig. 10. Note that for this step, the input set is
not the output of the previous step. For applications where the Java
bytecode can not be converted to Dalvik code, we take as input the
original dex file of the application. In this way, the problems of the
previous step do not interfere with the results of this fourth step.
Observation 11 Nearly all 130 inputs were successfully processed.
There is no clear relation between the size of the previous apk file
and the creation time of the new apk. Some applications gener-
ate an exception because their size is too big and can thus not be
processed by the zip utility.
Observation 12 For 95% of the applications it takes less than five
seconds regardless of the device and of the size of the original apk
file. There is no significant difference in the computation time be-
tween applications as it is the case in Fig. 6 and 9.
Conclusion 5 It is feasible to create apk files on smartphones. The
time to create a new apk file is negligible compared to the time to
convert bytecode or to manipulate bytecode with Soot. The differ-
ence in the computation time only reflects the difference of CPU
speed.
4.8 Signing the Generated apk File
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Signing time of applications is represented in Fig. 11.
Observation 13 Almost all 130 Android applications were success-
fully processed. There is no clear relation between the size of the
apk file and the signature time of the apk file. Some applications
generate an exception because their size is too big and can thus not
be processed (14 on smartphone2 10 on tablet1).
Observation 14 For 95% of the applications a maximum of 12
seconds is required to sign the application regardless of the device
and the size of the apk file.
Conclusion 6 It is feasible to sign apk files on smartphones. Sim-
ilarly to the apk file creation step, the computation time is negli-
gible. The difference observed between smartphone1 and smart-
phone2 reflects the difference in their CPU clock frequencies.
4.9 Conclusion
4.9.1 Feasibility
Those experiments show that it is feasible to manipulate byte-
code directly on Android devices. The most expensive steps of
the process are the conversion of Dalvik to Java bytecode and vice
versa, and the Soot bytecode manipulation step. However, depend-
ing on the manipulation to be made on the bytecode, ASM could be
sufficient. Table 3 is a summary of all the experiments for smart-
phone2 and highlights the feasibility of the whole approach. Values
for the sum of all steps for the Soot and ASM version are computed
from the application that successfully passed through all steps. For
an ASM-based instrumentation it takes a median time of 120 sec-
onds to process an application. We think that users would agree
with waiting 2 minutes before starting using an application, if they
are provided more guarantees with this instrumentation process en-
abling e.g. malware detection. For the biggest application, it takes
952 seconds, i.e. less than 16 minutes which also seems reasonable
to us, given that the vast majority of Android application are much
shorter and therefore need less time to be processed.
4.9.2 Blocking Factors and Optimization Opportuni-
ties
According to our analysis, the main blocking factors which can
be overcome are the following.
The maximum heap size required to analyze and transform appli-
cations is an issue for many transformation steps. We think that this
issue will be easily solved by 1) the next generation of more pow-
erful hardware and 2) the upcoming versions of the Android OS
and virtual machines which will likely have a significantly higher
maximum heap size (e.g. Android 4 heap size is set to 48MiB).
Actually, Dalvik to Java conversion and Java to Dalvik conver-
sion are two very time expensive steps. They are required to use
unmodified versions of Soot and ASM. However, those steps could
be skipped if we had either 1) an ASM-like library for manipulating
Dalvik bytecode or 2) a bi-directional transformation directly from
Dalvik bytecode to Jimple bytecode which are both register based.
We are now studying the required effort to design and implement
such tools.
Last but not least, we have used tools in a completely unmodified
version (in particular dex2jar, Soot). Most of these tools were not
meant to run on platforms with limited resources and were never
optimized as such. In other terms, we believe that there are proba-
bly many optimization opportunities in terms of CPU and memory
consumption.
To sum up, our results show that we can reasonably imagine to
manipulate the bytecode on 100% of our dataset applications within
at most minutes.
4.9.3 Threats to Validity
Let us now discuss the threats to validity of our experimental
results.
Implementation Bug: Our results hold as far as there is no seri-
ous bug in the implementation of any of the five programs
involved in the five steps, as well as in the glue and measure-
ment code we wrote.
Dataset Generalizability: Our dataset may not be representative of
the Android applications used in the real-world.
Linear Extrapolation: The linear relations we establish for the
Dalvik to Java and the Java to Dalvik conversions holds for
bytecode size less or equal to 300KiB. It may not hold for
bytecode whose size is bigger. In the presence of non-linear
singularities, it may not be possible to analyze large applica-
tions.
Bytecode Manipulation Time: Our results on the bytecode ma-
nipulation time were obtained with relatively simple trans-
formations. It may be the case that complex transformations
are not of the same order of magnitude. However, for the
use cases presented in Section 3, the instrumentation that is
needed is mostly monitoring and proxying. We see no reason
why this may take a much longer time.
5. RELATED WORK
Monitoring applications.
The idea of monitoring smartphone applications at runtime re-
cently emerged, due to the explosion of “mobile” malware and the
increasing sophistication of mobile OS.
Bose et al. [2] aimed at detecting malware based on their be-
havior at runtime. For this, they added hooks in the Symbian OS
emulator to track OS and API calls. In other words, malware de-
tection is only achieved in the emulator, in vitro. On the contrary,
we aim malware detection in live user environments, in vivo and
showed in this paper that is it is feasible in the mid-term.
Step Name Min.
Time
(s)
Avg.
Time
(s)
Median
Time
(s)
Max.
Time
(s)
App. Feasibility
Conversion .dex to .jar (a-b) 0.22 43.76 28.9 250.2 104/130 (80%) ???
Analyzing .jar with Soot(b-c) 25.8 76 26 187.7 3/130 (2.3%)
Analyzing .jar with ASM(b-c) 1.55 90.45 65.1 594.67 129/130 (99.2%) ????
Conversion class to dex (c-d) 0.09 28.07 22.8 71 39/130 (30%) ??
Creating new .apk (d-e) 0.06 1.89 0.87 15.1 119/130 (91.5%) ????
Signing new .apk (e-f) 0.71 3.85 3.0 21.67 116/130 (89.2%) ????
All Steps with Soot (a-b-c-d-e-f) 26.88 153.57 81.57 545.67 3/130 (2.3%) ?
All Steps with ASM (a-b-c-d-e-f) 2.63 168.02 120.67 952.64 39/130 (30%) ???
Table 2: Summary (for Smartphone2)
Step Name Min.
Time
(s)
Avg.
Time
(s)
Median
Time
(s)
Max.
Time
(s)
App. Feasibility
Conversion .dex to .jar (a-b) 0.19 25.6 17.85 158.9 119/130 (91.5%) ???
Analyzing .jar with Soot(b-c) 24.2 76 352 1054 19/130 (14.6%) ?
Analyzing .jar with ASM(b-c) 1.55 11.3 7.06 65.5 119/130 (91.5%) ????
Conversion class to dex (c-d) 0.09 29.5 20.2 80.2 33/130 (25.3%) ??
Creating new .apk (d-e) 0.03 1.6 0.5 20.9 121/130 (93.1%) ????
Signing new .apk (e-f) 0.4 3.4 1.91 27.3 120/130 (92.3%) ????
All Steps with Soot (a-b-c-d-e-f) 24.91 136.1 392.46 1341.3 19/130 (14.6%) ?
All Steps with ASM (a-b-c-d-e-f) 2.26 71.4 47.52 352.8 33/130 (25.3%) ???
Table 3: Summary (for Tablet1)
Enck et al. [8] presented a runtime monitoring framework called
TaintDroid, which allows taint tracking and analysis to track pri-
vacy leaks in Android. Their prototype is based on a modified
version of the Dalvik virtual machine which runs Android appli-
cations. Similarly, Costa et al. [6] extends the Java virtual machine
for mobile devices (Java ME) for adding runtime monitoring ca-
pabilities. On the contrary, our feasibility study indicates that it is
possible to achieve runtime monitoring in an unmodified Android
system.
Recently, Burgera et al. [4] presented an approach to detect mal-
ware based on collected operating system calls. Runtime monitor-
ing can be done at different granularity levels. While the approach
described by Burgera et al. is at the OS call grain, we aim at pro-
viding runtime monitoring at the API call level, i.e. much more
fine-grained and closer to the application domain of mobile appli-
cations.
Davis et al. [7] presented an Android Application rewriting frame-
work prototype, and discussed its use for monitoring an application,
and for implementing fine-grained Access Control.
Finally, Shabtai et al. detects malware based on the collection
and analysis of various system metrics, such as CPU usage, number
of packets sent through the Wi-Fi, etc. This is an indirect way
of detecting malware behavior. Again, by monitoring API calls,
we observe the application behavior directly. The empirical results
presented in this paper shows that this is actually possible.
Advertisement Permissions separation.
Shekhar et al. [18] proposed a new Android advertisement sys-
tem that would allow to have an application and its advertisement
module to run in different processes, and hence have a different
permission set. This new system has to be manually inserted into
the application during the development phase, since no automated
application modification is provided.
Pearce et al. [16] made the case for a Advertisement framework
that would be integrated inside the Android platform. Every de-
veloper would be able to use the custom-built API that would be
available on Android devices. This approach requires a modifica-
tion of the Android framework, and that a given user has a device
with a Android version embeding this advertisement system.
Permission Policy.
Reddy et al. [17] claim that security of the Android platform
would be improved by creating “application-centric permissions”
i.e. permissions expressing what an application can do rather than
current Android permissions that express what ressource an appli-
cation can use. They wrote a library that allows the ‘application-
centric permissions” to be managed. In addition, they started devel-
oping a tool called “redexer” whose aim is to automatically rewrite
existing applications in order for them to use these new permis-
sions.
Nauman et al. [14] extended the Android policy-based security
model so that it can enforce constraints at runtime. The tool they
created, called Apex, allows a user to express limits imposed to an
application’s use of any permission: For example, it becomes pos-
sible with Apex to grant the SEND_SMS permission to any given
application while ensuring that this application will not be able to
send more than a user-defined amount a text message each day.
The user also has the possibility to change her mind, and to totally
prevent the application from sending short messages; This is an im-
portant improvement over the stock Android OS because it allows
users to specify a much finer-grained policy, instead of having to
choose between either granting an application every permission it
may request at installation time or not installing this application.
However, this approach requires modifications deep inside the An-
droid framework, and hence would need to be backed by Google
and integrated into future versions of Android if it was to be widely
used.
6. CONCLUSION
The toolchain we propose and evaluate in this paper is a mile-
stone that respond to the recent claim of Stravou et al. [19] about
the urgent need for bytecode analysis to perform in-vivo security
checks on mobile phones. We have 1) proposed a tool chain al-
lowing the manipulation, instrumentation and analysis of Android
bytecode and 2) shown that it is possible to run the tool chain in
a reasonable amount of time directly on unmodified smartphones
with unmodified Android software stack. Concretely, our experi-
ment shows that with ASM, 39 (30%) applications of our dataset
can be instrumented in less than 952 seconds (with a median time of
120s). Moreover, we discuss specific limitations that we observed,
such as the hardcoded heap size of Android systems.
We believe that those various limitations could be quickly over-
come, at least for two main reasons. First, we used off-the-shelf
Java tools that are not optimized to run on environments where re-
sources (memory/CPU) are limited, and there may be possibilities
of significant optimization. Second, the hardware and OS evolu-
tion of smartphones will make it possible to process ever bigger
Android applications (for instance, on Android 4, the default size
of the heap is twice as large as in the previous version).
We are currently working on other use cases. In particular, we
are implementing a behavioral malware detection approach that is
set up and run on the smartphone. This approach involves instru-
menting the bytecode to redirect API method calls to stubs respon-
sible for detecting malicious behavior.
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